

## SHARED EMOTIONS AND COLLECTIVE AFFECTIVE INTENTIONALITY\*

The aim of this paper is to present an account of shared emotions and to embed it within a broader understanding of collective affective intentionality. I use the phrase *collective affective intentionality* as an umbrella term covering all possible forms of feeling together. The term *shared emotion*, in contrast, is used to refer to a particular type of episode of feeling together – episodes that are defined by the *sharing* of *emotions*, in contrast to other forms of feeling together.

Over the course of this paper, I will address four questions concerning shared emotions: (1) What is a shared *emotion*? This question addresses the specificity of the sharing of emotions in contrast to the sharing of other mental states like beliefs or intentions. (2) How is an emotion *shared*? This question concerns the collectivity constitutive of the sharing of an emotional episode. (3) What are the *conditions of possibility* for the sharing of emotions? This issue addresses the social mechanisms that need to be in place to enable the sharing of emotions. It will also concern the contextualization of shared emotions within the broader field of collective affective intentionality. Dealing with this third issue will point towards a fourth question: (4) What are the *social functions*

of shared emotions?

I will not answer these questions one after the other, but rather proceed in three steps. First, I set the stage for the following discussion of shared emotions by providing an overview of the major theories in philosophy of emotion, focusing on how the rather new debate on shared emotions emerged. Second, I present my account of shared emotions based on a phenomenological approach to collective affective intentionality. Third, I contextualize this account within a broader understanding of collective affective intentionality and draw attention to the social dynamics into which feeling together is embedded.

### *1. Setting the stage: shared emotions within philosophy of emotions*

20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy of emotion has been dominated by two broad traditions: somatic feedback theories<sup>1</sup> and cognitivist theories<sup>2</sup>. Each of these approaches faces a key challenge: For *somatic feedback theories*, which understand emotions primarily as physiological processes, the challenge is how what they describe as an emotion is intentional. For *cognitivist theories*, which understand emotions primarily as evaluative judgments, the challenge is how what they describe as an emotion is affective. These two challenges are condensed into the formula of *affective intentionality*<sup>3</sup>. Affective intentionality refers to affective states as

being *intentional and affective*. The leading intuition is that in the case of affective intentionality, «the intentional and the phenomenal aspect» are «intertwined in such an inextricable way as to make the intentionality of an emotion be a matter of its specific phenomenology»<sup>4</sup>. The focus on the intertwining of intentionality and phenomenology has led to what might be called a *phenomenological turn in the philosophy of emotion*<sup>5</sup>.

Let me introduce this thought via Bennett Helm's understanding of emotions as "felt evaluations"<sup>6</sup>. Helm's aim is to account for the emotionality of emotions while maintaining their intentionality. He does so by claiming that emotions are mental states *sui generis*, uniquely characterized by an evaluative content that is eminently affective. Helm develops his account in opposition to cognitivism, which reduces emotions to cognitive states (possibly in combination with conative states). In contrast, Helm argues that

«emotions do not merely involve some pleasant or painful sensation among other components, as cognitivist theories require. Rather, they are pleasures and pains and can be re-described as such: to be afraid *is* to be pained by danger (and not by one's stomach); such a pain is not a component of, but is rather identical with, one's fear»<sup>7</sup>.

For the remainder of this paper, I will follow and further develop this *phenomenological approach to affective intentionality*.

After this preliminary definition of affective intentionality, I will continue with an overview of received accounts of *collective* affective intentionality<sup>8</sup>. To my knowledge, there are no accounts of collective affective-intentional states from the point of view of somatic feedback theories. There appears to be a good reason for this: If we understand the body as «the theatre of emotions»<sup>9</sup>, it is reasonable to assume that emotions are always felt within one's own body. If this is the case, it appears doubtful whether something like a truly collective emotion can exist. If the ability to experience emotions is necessarily linked to having a body, conceiving of collectives having emotions appears impossible. This thought is based on a very powerful intuition: *individualism about feelings*. Hans Bernhard Schmid explicated this intuition in a 2008 paper, which has become seminal for the debate on shared emotion. He did so by differentiating three interrelated claims of individualism about feelings: (1) *ontological individualism*, according to which feelings as conscious states are always ontologically subjective, i.e. part of the experience of an individual; (2) *epistemological individualism*, which holds that individuals have only access to their own feelings; and (3) *physical individualism*, which claims that individuals experience feelings

as localized in their own body<sup>10</sup>. If individualism about feelings is right, it appears doubtful whether theories that maintain a constitutive relation of emotions with feelings can conceptualize something like a genuinely shared emotion.

In contrast, there is an easy path for cognitivist theories to extend their approach to an account of collective emotions. Cognitivist theories can simply treat collective *affective* intentionality as a special case of collective intentionality. This is the approach Gilbert<sup>11</sup> took in her seminal paper on “Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings”. Gilbert suggests understanding a collective emotion as a joint commitment to an evaluative judgment. What is collective in a collective emotion is the evaluative judgment. Insofar as emotions are also constituted by an action tendency, a collective emotion might also involve a joint intention. In contrast, it is contingent whether the partaking individuals have corresponding feeling sensations. This solution has two advantages. First, it allows to think *collective affective intentionality* equivalent to *collective cognitive intentionality* and *collective conative intentionality*, which keeps the theory simple and on well-established conceptual grounds. Second, this solution avoids the challenge of individualism about feelings. Since feelings play no constitutive role for emotions, individualism about feelings is no obstacle for Gilbert’s

understanding of collective emotions.

Despite these advantages, cognitivist accounts like Gilbert’s encounter a serious challenge. I take this challenge to be so serious that I will suggest that it is more promising to follow the sketched phenomenological approach to an understanding of collective affective intentionality. Cognitivist theories face what Helm<sup>12</sup> called the “problem of emotionality”. Put bluntly, the question is whether what Gilbert is conceptualizing is in fact a collective *emotion*. The worry that this is not the case can be made plausible via two questions: (a) What distinguishes collective guilt from the judgment that one is guilty?<sup>13</sup> (b) What distinguishes collective guilt from the joint commitment to feel guilty?<sup>14</sup> It appears intuitively plausible that we should be able to make these distinctions, but it appears doubtful whether Gilbert can provide us with the conceptual tools for making them. It is obvious that she cannot refer to feelings for this task, as she holds that it is contingent whether feelings accompany an emotion. And she does not provide any other component that might serve this task. Thus, I agree with Salmela’s<sup>15</sup> observation that the joint commitment Gilbert describes appears to establish a feeling rule rather than an actual emotion<sup>16</sup>.

Against this background, we can make sense of Schmid’s<sup>17</sup> suggestion that we should take the phenomenological turn in

philosophy of emotions to the collective level. As we have seen, a phenomenological approach to affective intentionality emphasizes that affective-intentional states need to be understood as *at once affective and intentional*, without reducing either aspect to the other. As a consequence, a phenomenological approach underscores the inextricable link between the intentionality of an affective state and its experiential dimension. The intentionality of an emotion cannot be separated from the felt experience; rather, it needs to be seen *as* the affective experience. This is expressed in Helm's understanding of emotions as *felt evaluations*.

Coming back to the issue of collective affective intentionality, it should be clear now that a phenomenological approach to affective intentionality is committed to the view that feelings are constitutive of emotions. As a consequence, such an approach has to defend the claim that shared emotions, at least to some extent, are a matter of the sharing of feelings. Accordingly, Schmid<sup>18</sup> made the suggestion that a phenomenological approach to shared emotions requires us to account for the sharing of feelings in a straightforward sense. However, this implies that such an approach to collective affective intentionality needs to face the challenge of individualism about feelings. In other words, a phenomenological approach to shared emotions needs to offer a

plausible account of what it means to *feel together*. Sánchez Guerrero states the task in the following way:

«It seems that a philosophical account of collective affective intentionality grounded in the thought that affective intentionality is a matter of the world-directedness of our emotional feelings must be able to show that at least certain feelings [...] can be shared in a non-metaphorical sense of 'sharing'»<sup>19</sup>.

However, this raises a serious challenge. For this task appears to contradict the core intuition of individualism about feelings, which precisely holds that something like a genuinely shared feeling is strictly impossible.

However, we should not be too quick in jumping to the conclusion that we are facing an impossible task. Rather, I suggest that we take a closer look at individualism about feelings and separate those intuitions that hold under closer inspection from those that turn out to be misguided. More specifically, I suggest to identify two valid sets of intuitions that motivate individualism about feelings<sup>20</sup>. The first concerns consciousness, with the leading intuition being that, while it might be meaningful to speak of groups having a mind, the idea of groups having consciousness is unthinkable. The second concerns the

body. Here, the intuition is that it is implausible to speak of a group having a body in any other than a metaphorical sense. If we agree that these intuitions hold under closer inspection, as I want to suggest here, that entails that we need an *understanding of feeling together that does not imply a group body or group consciousness*.

Without being able to go into detail, let me briefly hint at possible paths towards meeting these challenges. Concerning *consciousness*, we need an account of several individuals participating in an emotional episode without having to defend the claim that a certain group is the ontological bearer of the experiential state. Concerning the *body*, we need an account of several bodies being properly connected with each other, so that they can experience an emotional episode together, without requiring a group body as the bearer of feelings. As the issue of consciousness will be more prominent in the following section, let me briefly add a few remarks on the issue of embodiment: When it comes to the body, the discussion often takes the form of a wrong dichotomy, according to which we either need to accept the dubious notion of a group body, or reject the notion of feelings beyond individual bodies altogether. However, between the claim of feelings being locked inside individual bodies, and the claim of a group body, there is ample room for a nuanced understanding of how feelings can be experienced

together by a plurality of individuals. The question is not whether there is a group body capable of having feelings. Rather, the significant issue is how or embodiment opens us up to the possibility of experiencing feelings together with others.

## 2. Towards an account of shared emotions

In this section, I will present an account of shared emotions based on a phenomenological approach to collective affective intentionality. I will develop my proposal via a critical assessment of Salmela's account<sup>21</sup>. Salmela condensed his understanding of shared emotions into the following definition: Two or more individuals share an emotion if they “experience an emotion of the same type with similar (1) evaluative content and (2) affective experience”, and are mutually aware of this<sup>22</sup>. Salmela's crucial point is that for an emotional episode to constitute a case of a shared emotion, it is not enough that the evaluative content is shared, as cognitivists would like to have it. A shared emotion also requires the sharing of the affective experience.

The motivation behind this claim appears to be that the sharing of evaluative content alone is insufficient for distinguishing shared emotions from group-based emotions. We can speak of a *group-based emotion* when an individual experiences an emotion based on her

membership in a group. In such a case, she evaluates a situation according to the relevant concerns of the group (rather than her personal concerns) and feels the emotion *as a member* of that group. For instance, consider a football fan who gets angry when reading about a new regulation against pyrotechnics in the stadium, although she is not personally affected as she has never used pyrotechnics herself and even finds them annoying. We want to be able to distinguish the case of individuals – simultaneously but independently – having such an emotion based on their membership in the same group (e.g. the group of football fans), from the case in which individuals – in some form of co-dependence – experience their anger *together*. To be able to conceptualize this distinction, it appears sensible to say that in the latter case, the individuals *also share the affective experience*, whereas in the former case, they *only share the evaluative content*.

An intriguing element of Salmela's account is that it allows to distinguish degrees of sharedness regarding both the evaluative content and the affective experience. With respect to the affective experience, Salmela and Nagatsu<sup>23</sup> point to the various forms and degrees of synchronization regarding the constituents of an emotion. Empirical findings on emotional contagion<sup>24</sup>, motor mimicry<sup>25</sup>, facial mimicry<sup>26</sup>, and related phenomena have shown that affective convergence can

come in various modalities and can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms. Salmela's focus, however, is more on the possible forms in which evaluative content can be shared. Salmela defends a concern-based account of emotions according to which concerns psychologically underlie emotions. The gist is that someone experiences an emotion when she perceives something favorably or adversely happening to the focus of her concern, with the emotion targeting the perceived cause of the impact. For instance, because one is concerned about the stadium atmosphere, one gets angry when one reads of regulation that one perceives as interfering with fan culture. Following Tuomela<sup>27</sup>, Salmela<sup>28</sup> differentiates sharedness of concern according to various degrees of collectivity, from overlapping private concerns to collective concerns of a group.

Whereas I think that Salmela put forward the most convincing account of shared emotions available, I find two aspects wanting. First, although I agree with Salmela and Nagatsu<sup>29</sup> that the mechanisms of affective synchronization are mostly an empirical question, more needs to be said about the sharing of affective experience. Second, I am skeptical whether mutual awareness is enough to account for the genuine sharing of an emotion. Following an idea of the phenomenologist Edith Stein<sup>30</sup>, I want to submit that for an emotion to

be genuinely shared, it is not sufficient that we, each individually, experience an emotion as members of a community (and reciprocally know about each other's emotions); we need to experience it *together*. The *togetherness* at stake here cannot be reduced to mutual awareness. Rather, we need to *trace it in the experience*. Following Szanto<sup>31</sup> and León *et. al.*<sup>32</sup>, I recently suggested to elaborate what it means to *experience an emotional episode together* in terms of two requirements<sup>33</sup>: the plurality requirement and the integration requirement.

The trivial sense of the *plurality requirement* states that more than one individual needs to be part of the experience; in other words, one cannot have a shared emotion on one's own. In the non-trivial sense, the plurality requirement asserts that the involved individuals need to be aware of the plurality of partaking individuals; there needs to be «an experienced differentiation between them»<sup>34</sup>. When sharing an emotion, it is part of the specific type of experience that one is aware of the plurality of partaking individuals. Sharing an emotion cannot require individuals to confound themselves with each other or to dissolve their individuality into some sort of group mind. Rather, it is part of this specific experience that the individuals are aware of each other as distinct individuals. The self-other-distinction does not only remain intact in a shared emotion, it is rather constitutive of this type of

experience. The *integration requirement* points out that in an episode of emotional sharing, the participants not only experience the emotional episode as separate individuals, they also experience it *together*. A *sense of togetherness* forms a constitutive part of the experience. Experiencing a shared emotion comes with an awareness of 'us' as the plural emoter. I do not think that each participant needs not to be aware of each particular other participant, as the sense of togetherness can also take the form of an open horizon. The live audience in a stadium, for instance, is a typical setting for shared emotions, although the size of the gathering makes it impossible for one participant to track all others. However, that does not speak against spectators sensing themselves as making the experience together<sup>35</sup>.

How does my proposal relate to the issues of consciousness and the body? Let me begin with the worry about group consciousness. My suggestion is that we are indeed capable of sometimes experiencing an emotion as *our* emotion; in these instances, we are aware of a *plurality of individuals* experiencing the emotion *together*. Defending this claim does not require to postulate consciousness on the part of the group. It is rather crucial to my proposal to maintain that only individuals are aware of or can reflect on the shared experience. However, there is no reason to assume, as Salmela<sup>36</sup> suggested, that the *sense of togetherness* vanishes

once a participant reflects on the experience. In cases of genuinely shared emotions, the awareness of ‘us’ as the plural emoter can stand the test of reflection. Phenomenological analysis suggests that there can be a «*non-misleading sense of plural selfhood*»<sup>37</sup>. Moving to the issue of the body, I am suggesting that the sharing of affective experience is based on (bodily) synchronization leading to affective convergence<sup>38</sup>. Far from promoting the idea of a group body, my proposal is based on an understanding of embodiment that emphasizes that the body does not close us off from each other; rather, my body connects me to others in such a way that I can immediately affect them, and they can immediately affect me. Such an understanding of the body as the scene of relatedness is not only supported by the already mentioned research on affective synchronization, but also by findings in developmental psychology<sup>39</sup> and phenomenological investigations into embodiment<sup>40</sup>.

To sum up this section, I have suggested the following characteristics of shared emotions<sup>41</sup>: (1) the *intentionality requirement*, i.e. the shared directedness towards the emotion’s target in light of the shared focus of the underlying concern; (2) the *affectivity requirement*, according to which the sharedness cannot be reduced to the cognitive or evaluative dimension, but also involves the sharing of the concrete affective experience; (3) the *plurality requirement*, i.e. an awareness of the plurality

of partaking individuals; and (4) the *integration requirement*, i.e. a sense of togetherness characterizing the experience.

### 3. *Embedding shared emotions within collective affective intentionality*

After presenting my account of shared emotion, the aim of this third section is to contextualize this account within a broader understanding of collective affective intentionality. Whereas the previous section approached episodes of shared emotions in terms of a static analysis, this section adopts a dynamic perspective focusing on their genesis. Such a dynamic perspective allows us to see that *shared emotions* are only one form of *feeling together*; there are other forms, e.g. forms of emotional convergence, that do not fulfill the criteria to count as shared emotions. Shared emotions are only possible under rather demanding conditions of integration and synchronization between individuals, and play out as transient experiential episodes with rather short duration. More specifically, I suggest two conditions of possibility for shared emotions: (1) synchronic interaction, enabling affective synchronization; (2) diachronic integration into an community of shared concern, enabling a unified evaluation of a situation<sup>42</sup>. Due to limited space, I can only discuss the second condition here<sup>43</sup>. I have already addressed this condition implicitly when discussing Salmela’s

concern-based account of shared emotions. In this section, I will draw on Sánchez Guerrero's<sup>44</sup> understanding of *caring with one another* and Helm's<sup>45</sup> notion of a *unified evaluative perspective* to further specify this condition.

Sánchez Guerrero offers a Heidegger-inspired approach to collective affective intentionality according to which «human intentionality, in general, may be understood in terms of an essentially shareable (but not necessarily collective) openness to the world». Sánchez Guerrero main contribution is cashing out what such sharing amounts to. To begin with, it involves a «sense of being in an essentially shareable world»<sup>46</sup>. This implies that our sense of belongingness to this world, our familiarity with the world is also something «one shares (or at least could share) with other human beings»<sup>47</sup>. Moreover, this requires a sense that «we human individuals share a mode of being that is defined by care»<sup>48</sup>. Combined, this constitutes our «belongingness to an essentially shareable world»<sup>49</sup>. The gist of Sánchez Guerrero's account is that the essential shareability of our belongingness to the world is the condition of possibility for «*sharing a number of concrete concerns that determine a specific way of being-in-the-world*».<sup>50</sup> Thereby, he provides an existential-ontological account of how diachronic integration into a community of shared concern can come about. Sánchez Guerrero uses the phrase *caring with*

*one another* to refer to several individuals sharing a number of concrete concerns, a specific sense of things mattering. Against the background of *caring with one another*, individuals can come to feel concrete emotional episodes together.

Helm's<sup>51</sup> account allows us to take a closer look at the peculiar relationship between *caring with one another* and *feeling emotional episodes together*<sup>52</sup>. More specifically, I suggest following Sánchez Guerrero's<sup>53</sup> reading of Helm according to which emotions serve a double-role: they are *disclosing* and *co-constituting* the significance something has. Emotions are not mere responses to significance, as they are also co-constituting that very significance. Introducing Helm's idea that emotions are always grounded in an *evaluative perspective*, i.e. a specific *view of the world*, allows us to be more specific about the claim that emotions are disclosing and co-constituting significance. On the one hand, a particular emotion usually *discloses* the significance something has. The specific pattern of my emotions, on the other hand, contributes to the constitution of that very significance. The idea of something having significance only makes sense with reference to someone for whom it is significant. Significance is always *significance for someone*.<sup>54</sup> As a consequence, it is insufficient to look at a single emotion in order to understand its significance. Rather, we need to see an emotional episode as a constituent of a coherent

pattern of evaluative attitudes. A particular emotion can be *explained* and *justified* by its integration into an *evaluative perspective*. The crucial idea is that our emotions not only reveal the significance a specific entity has for us, they also make manifest our evaluative perspective, the specific cares and concerns that make up who we are.

Later, Helm<sup>55</sup> transferred this account to the collective level by claiming that the notion of an *evaluative perspective* is not restricted to individuals. Under certain circumstances, groups can be said to be integrated in such a way as to develop a *unified evaluative perspective* of their own. Helm adopts the double role of emotions to the group level. On the one hand, the group's unified evaluative perspective is constituted by the emotions of its members. On the other, the evaluative perspective of the group exerts pressure on the members to have emotions that conform to the relevant evaluative pattern. Seen from this angle, members can come to discover what significance something has for the group. Moreover, members are in a position to criticize each other from the perspective of the group if they fail to display the appropriate emotions.

It should be noted that Helm's accounts of the relation between emotions and the evaluative perspective in which they are grounded, between emotions and the significance of their target, and between the

unified evaluative perspective of the group and the emotions of its members are all circular. However, Helm embraces these circularities, defending the view that these circles are not of the vicious kind, but rather making manifest the specific role that emotions play in our lives as caring beings.

Despite these circularities, Helm's account of an evaluative perspective appears rather static to me. I suggest adopting a more dynamic understanding of caring as the basic level of our engagement with the world and others. More specifically, I want to propose a dynamic view of the relation between *caring with one another* and the *sharing of emotional episodes*. On the one hand, the sharing of an emotional episode is, among other conditions, made possible by a number of individuals sharing a particular set of concerns. On the other hand, the sharing of a set of concerns arguably comes about via individuals sharing a number of emotional episodes<sup>56</sup>. The interplay between *caring with one another* and *feeling together* makes manifest a crucial social dynamic. The suggestion is that the sharing of emotional episodes and the integration into groups of shared concerns tend to form self-energizing circles: sharing concerns makes it more likely that individuals experience concrete emotional episodes together, which in turn strengthen the sharedness of concerns<sup>57</sup>. If this analysis is right, it

reveals the sharing of emotions as a powerful social force. It is likely one of the main sources of cohesion within a group, establishing a set of shared concerns. At this point, however, we should not forget the flipside of such cohesion, namely that the constitution of a particular group implies the demarcation from other groups. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of how the sharing of emotions is embedded in the dynamics of collective affective intentionality requires the careful consideration of these inter-group dynamics.

#### 4. Conclusion

In the introduction, I promised to address four questions. In response to the first question – What is a shared *emotion*? – I introduced the label *affective intentionality* in order to overcome the dualism between cognition and affect, rationality and emotionality. Furthermore, I build on Helm’s understanding of emotions as felt evaluations for defending the claim that an episode of affective intentionality is at once (bodily) felt and intentionally directed towards its target. I answered the second question – How is an emotion *shared*? – by introducing four requirements for a shared emotion: the *intentionality requirement*, according to which a shared emotion is characterized by shared directedness towards an object or event; the *affectivity requirement*, which

states that the sharedness cannot be reduced to the cognitive or evaluative dimension, but also involves the sharing of affective experience; the *plurality requirement*, which emphasizes that in emotional sharing, participants are aware of the plurality of partaking individuals; finally, the *integration requirement* states that a sense of togetherness is a constitutive part of that experience. The third question addressed the *conditions of possibility* for the sharing of emotions. I emphasized that shared emotions are only possible under rather demanding conditions of integration and synchronization between individuals: First, a unified evaluation of a situation needs to be enabled by the sharing of relevant concerns; second, sufficient interaction between the involved individuals needs to enable affective synchronization among them in the particular instance of emotional sharing. Responding to the fourth question – What are the *social functions* of shared emotions? – I showed that it would be wrong to assume a one-sided relation of constitution between the sharing of concrete emotional episodes and the integration into groups of shared concerns. An analysis of the genesis of collective affective intentionality makes manifest the social dynamics in which the sharing of emotions and the sharing of concerns evolve through reciprocal stimulation. I suggest that a study of the social functions of shared emotions needs to focus on these self-energizing circles of

affective sharing and social integration.

GERHARD THONHAUSER

\* The work on this article was part of the project “Sports Fans: A Phenomenological Study of Affective Sharedness” funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): J 4055-G24. The project is hosted by Jan Slaby at the Institute of Philosophy of Free University Berlin and associated with the CRC 1171 *Affective Societies*. Significant portions of this article were written during a short stay as Visit Research Fellow at University College Cork, enabled by the friendly invitation of Alessandro Salice. During my stay, I had the chance of presenting a draft of this paper at the departments *Visiting Speaker Series*. I thank all participants for their helpful comments, notably Adam Loughnane, Xiao Ouyang, Don Ross, Alessandro Salice and Joel Walmsley. Moreover, I thank Christian von Scheve and Thomas Szanto for reading an earlier version and providing valuable suggestions. Finally, I am indebted to Dan MacCarthy for his hospitality during my stay in Cork.

<sup>1</sup> Cfr. W. James, *What Is an Emotion?*, “Mind”, 9, 34, 1884, pp. 188–205; C. Lange, *Om Sindsbevægelser. Et Psyko-Fysiologisk Studie*, Jacob Lund, Copenhagen 1885; C. Lange, *Über Gemütsbewegungen. Ihr Wesen Und Ihr Einfluß Auf Körperliche, Besonders Auf Krankhafte Lebenserscheinungen. Ein Medizinisch-Psychologische Studie*, Thomas, Leipzig 1887; A. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, Putnam, New York 1994; J. Prinz, *Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, Routledge, London 1963; R. Solomon, *The Passions. Emotions and the Meaning of Life*, 2nd ed. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis 1993.

<sup>3</sup> To my knowledge, the label “affective intentionality” was introduced into current debate via two independent sources. It was casually used in German by Hans Bernhard Schmid in a book first published in 2005 (cfr. H. B. Schmid, *Wir-Intentionalität. Kritik Des Ontologischen Individualismus Und Rekonstruktion Der Gemeinschaft*, Alber, Freiburg 2012, p. 50). A few years later, Schmid used the phrase “collective affective intentionality” in the title of his seminal paper “Shared Feelings: Towards a Phenomenology of Collective Affective Intentionality” (cfr. H. B. Schmid, *Shared Feelings: Towards a Phenomenology of Collective Affective Intentionality*, H. B. Schmid, N. Psarros, K. Schulte-Ostermann, eds, *Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality*, Ontos, Frankfurt am Main 2008) and reused it in chapter 4 of Schmid (H. B. Schmid, *Plural Action*, Springer, Berlin 2009). Simultaneously, the label “affective intentionality” was made popular by Jan Slaby and Achim Stephan (cfr. J. Slaby, A. Stephan, *Affective Intentionality and Self-Consciousness*, “Consciousness and Cognition”, 17, 2008, pp. 506–13; J. Slaby et al. *Affektive Intentionalität – Hintergrundgeföhle, Möglichkeitsräume,*

*Handlungsorientierung*, Mentis, Paderborn 2011) in the context of the research project “animal emotionale”.

<sup>4</sup> H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, Springer, Cham 2016, p. 58.

<sup>5</sup> Cfr. P. Goldie, *The Emotions. A Philosophical Exploration*, Clarendon Press, Exford 2000; B. W. Helm, *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001; M. Ratcliffe, *Feelings of Being*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008; J. Slaby, S. Achim, *Affective Intentionality and Self-Consciousness*, “Consciousness and Cognition” 17, 2008, pp. 506–13; H. B. Schmid, *Plural Action*, Springer, Berlin 2009.

<sup>6</sup> B. W. Helm, *Felt Evaluations. A Theory of Pleasures and Pains*, “American Philosophical Quarterly”, 39 2002, pp. 13–30.

<sup>7</sup> Ivi, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> For an overview of the interdisciplinary debate on collective emotions (cfr. C. von Scheve, M. Salmela, eds., *Collective Emotions*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014).

<sup>9</sup> A. Damasio, *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, Putnam Publishing, New York 1994, p. 155.

<sup>10</sup> H. B. Schmid, *Plural Action*, p. 70.

<sup>11</sup> Cfr. G. Margaret, *Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings*, “Journal of Ethics”, 6, 2002, pp. 115–143.

<sup>12</sup> H. W. Bennett, *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> A. Konzelmann Ziv, *Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited*, “Dialectica”, 61, 3, 2007, pp. 467–493.

<sup>14</sup> Cfr. M. Salmela, *Shared Emotions*, “Philosophical Explorations”, 15, 1, 2012, pp. 33–46.

<sup>15</sup> Ivi, p. 36.

<sup>16</sup> The notion of a joint commitment to a certain emotion can serve important functions – especially in the context of a normative account, as Gilbert develops it regarding collective guilt. However, it does not do the job when the task at hand is providing a plausible account of a number of individuals experiencing an emotional episode together.

<sup>17</sup> Cfr. H. B. Schmid, *Shared Feelings: Towards a Phenomenology of Collective Affective Intentionality*, H. B. Schmid, N. Psarros, K. Schulte-Ostermann, eds., *Concepts of Sharedness: Essays on Collective Intentionality*, Ontos, Frankfurt am Main 2008; H. B. Schmid, *Plural Action*.

<sup>18</sup> Cfr. H. B. Schmid, *Shared Feelings: Towards a Phenomenology of Collective Affective Intentionality*; H. B. Schmid, *Plural Action*.

<sup>19</sup> H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, p. 108.

<sup>20</sup> Cfr. H. B. Schmid, *Collective Emotions - Phenomenology, Ontology, and Ideology. What Should We*

*Learn From Max Scheler's War Propaganda*, "Thaumazein", 3, 2015, pp. 103–19.

<sup>21</sup> To be sure, Salmela does not consider himself a phenomenologist. Neither does Helm, whose theory will continue to serve as a background for my approach. It is rather my specific way of presenting their works that makes them productive for a phenomenological approach. At the same time, I will move beyond the traditional scope of a phenomenological analysis of experience, especially when taking the social conditions of possibility of emotional sharing into account. Thus, my approach will be a combination of phenomenological analyses of certain types of experiences with mostly sociological and social psychological investigations into the social conditions of those experiences.

<sup>22</sup> M. Salmela, M. Nagatsu, *Collective Emotions and Joint Action*, "Journal of Social Ontology", 2, 1, 2016, pp. 33–57.

<sup>23</sup> Ivi, p. 39.

<sup>24</sup> E. Hatfield, J. T. Cacioppo, R. L. Rapson, *Emotional Contagion*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994.

<sup>25</sup> Cfr. J. B. Bavelas, *Motor Mimicry as Primitive Empathy*, N. Eisenberg, J. Strayer, eds., *Empathy and Its Development*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, pp. 317–338.

<sup>26</sup> Cfr. B. Seibt, *Facial Mimicry in Its Social Setting*, "Frontiers in Psychology", 6, 2015, Article 1122, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01122>.

<sup>27</sup> Cfr. R. Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007.

<sup>28</sup> Cfr. M. Salmela, *Shared Emotions*, pp. 39–40.

<sup>29</sup> M. Salmela, M. Nagatsu, *Collective Emotions and Joint Action*.

<sup>30</sup> E. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*. The Collected Works of Edith Stein 3, ICS Publications. Washington, D.C. 1989, pp. 17–18.

<sup>31</sup> T. Szanto, *Husserl on Collective Intentionality*, A. Salice, H. B. Schmid, eds, *Social Reality: The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. History, Concepts, Problems*, Springer, Berlin 2016, pp. 145–172.

<sup>32</sup> F. León, T. Szanto, D. Zahavi, *Emotional Sharing and the Extended Mind*, "Synthese", 1–2, 2017, pp. 1–21.

<sup>33</sup> G. Thonhauser, *Shared Emotions: A Steinian Proposal*, "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences", <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9561-3> 2018.

<sup>34</sup> F. León, T. Szanto, D. Zahavi, *Emotional Sharing and the Extended Mind*, p. 14.

<sup>35</sup> My remarks on the sense of togetherness are inspired by analyses of communal experience in early phenomenology. For example, Edith Stein observed that communal experiences are characterized by a double-intentionality: besides an intention toward the target they also contain an "intention toward the communal experience" (E. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*. The Collected Works of Edith Stein 7, ICS Publications, Washington, D.C. 2000, p. 137). Gerda Walther appears to have traced the

same issue when elaborating on the "feeling of togetherness" or "feeling of unification" (*Einigungsgefühl*) constitutive of a communal experience (G. Walther, *Zur Ontologie Der Sozialen Gemeinschaften*, "Jahrbuch Für Philosophie Und Phänomenologische Forschung", 6, 1923, pp. 1–158; cfr. D. Zahavi, A. Salice, *Phenomenology of the We: Stein, Walther, Gurwitsch*, J. Kiverstein, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind*, Routledge, London 2017, pp. 515–527). Early phenomenology has recently come into focus for the debates on social cognition, collective intentionality and social ontology (cfr. T. Szanto, D. Moran, *Special Issue on Empathy and Collective Intentionality - The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein*, *Human Studies*, 38, 4, 2015; T. Szanto, D. Moran, *The Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the "We."*, Routledge, London 2016; A. Salice, H. B. Schmid, *Social Reality: The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. History, Concepts, Problems*, Springer, Berlin 2016).

<sup>36</sup> M. Salmela, *Shared Emotions*, p. 38.

<sup>37</sup> H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, Springer, Cham 2016, p. 112. My position is compatible with – indeed I take it to require – the fact that an individual can be mistaken about experiencing an emotional episode together with others. There are certainly cases in which the sharing turns out to be an illusion. In successful cases of shared emotion, however, the sharing receives further validation over time.

<sup>38</sup> An important question is whether the sharing of affective experience always requires physical co-presence, as one might take my proposal to suggest. Such a requirement seems to be too restrictive, especially considering the advancements in technological possibilities for mediated interaction. Thus, the idea of affective convergence through synchronization should include forms of mediated co-presence. This raises a whole set of questions about the relation of embodiment, mediated interaction and affective synchronization, which I cannot address in this paper. Here, my argument is simply that none of these considerations requires the postulation of a group body.

<sup>39</sup> Cfr. D. Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology*, Karnac Books, London 1998.

<sup>40</sup> Cfr. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Routledge, London & New York 2012; J. Krueger, *Merleau-Ponty on Shared Emotions and the Joint Ownership Thesis*, "Continental Philosophy Review", 46, 2013, pp. 509–531; T. Fuchs, S. Koch, *Embodied Affectivity: On Moving and Being Moved*, "Frontiers in Psychology. Psychology for Clinical Settings", 5, Article 508, 2014, pp. 1–12; H. Landweer, *Mass Emotion and Shared Feelings: A New Concept of Embodiment*, H. Feger, Xie Dikun, Wang Ge, eds., *Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy*, 2, pp.104–17, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York 2017.

<sup>41</sup> T. Szanto, *Stein and Walther on Shared Emotions: A Critical Comparison* presented at the Early Phenomenology on Affective Sharing, Free University Berlin, February 17, 2018.

<sup>42</sup> Cfr. J. Krueger, *The Affective 'We': Self-Regulation and Shared Emotions*, T. Szanto D. Moran, eds., *The Phenomenology of Sociality: Discovering the "We"*, Routledge, New York 2016, p. 270.

<sup>43</sup> As I already stated in a previous note, a number of complicated issues are related to the question which types of interaction can lead to affective synchronization.

<sup>44</sup> Cfr. H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, p. 133.

<sup>45</sup> Cfr. B. W. Helm, *Plural Agents*, "Nous", 42, 1, 2008, pp. 17–49.

<sup>46</sup> H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, p. 146.

<sup>47</sup> Ivi, p. 154.

<sup>48</sup> Ivi, p. 155.

<sup>49</sup> Ivi, p. 169.

<sup>50</sup> Ivi, p. 175.

<sup>51</sup> Cfr. B. W. Helm, *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.

<sup>52</sup> Helm's theory and Sánchez Guerrero's Heidegger-inspired account might seem far apart from each other. For sure, Helm is no Heidegger scholar and makes no reference to Heidegger. Moreover, he is miles apart from Heidegger in terms of terminology and philosophical style. However, some proximity between Helm's theory and Heidegger's basic ideas about human existence cannot be denied. Sánchez Guerrero picks up on these similarities to build his account that combines the main impulses from Heidegger and Helm. In a footnote, Sánchez Guerrero (H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, p. 142; FN 14) remarks that Helm's PhD advisor was John Haugeland. This might explain Helm's proximity to a Heidegger-inspired understanding of human existence, since Haugeland was not only a highly original philosopher, but also a brilliant interpreter of Heidegger. Most importantly for the present context, Haugeland vividly pointed to the specifically human mode of being as a being that cannot escape "giving a damn" (cfr. Z. Adams, J. Browning, *Giving a Damn. Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland*, MIT Press, Cambridge 2016). We always encounter entities as mattering to us one way or the other; we always experience them with some kind of significance.

<sup>53</sup> H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, p. 133.

<sup>54</sup> Note however, that neither Helm nor Sánchez Guerrero nor I support subjectivism about significance. Rather, significance can be said to be *subjective and objective at the same time*. While significance is always significance for someone, an individual can be right and wrong about the significance a specific object or event has. Although something having

significance only makes sense with reference to a subject, the significance something has is dependent upon its specific attributes. As a consequence, we can say that significance "is, on the one hand, *perspectively subjective*, and on the other, *objectively discoverable*." (H. A. Sánchez Guerrero, *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another. A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality*, p. 136).

<sup>55</sup> Cfr. B. W. Helm, *Plural Agents*, "Nous", 42, 1, 2008, pp. 17–49; B. W. Helm, *Emotional Communities of Respect*, C. von Scheve, M. Salmela, eds., *Collective Emotions*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, pp. 47–60; B. W. Helm, *Communities of Respect: Grounding Responsibility, Authority, and Dignity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017.

<sup>56</sup> This picture gets further complicated when taking into account Salmela's (M. Salmela, M. Nagatsu, *Collective Emotions and Joint Action*, pp. 36–40) suggestion, which I discussed in section 2, that the sharedness of concerns and of affective experiences can both come in various degrees.

<sup>57</sup> C. Scheve, S. Ismer, *Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions*, "Emotion Review", 5, 4, 2013, p. 5.