

## A RIDDLE ABOUT JUSTICE

Let's take:

- two different theories of justice: justice<sub>1</sub>, justice<sub>2</sub>;
- the question: 'is right<sub>2</sub> just<sub>1</sub>?'. Such a question calls into question justice<sub>1</sub> appealing to a different theory of justice (justice<sub>2</sub>).



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To put it simply, we do not consider justice<sub>1</sub> and justice<sub>2</sub> as self-contradictory, antinomic and so on.

Is it permissible to answer the question by making an appeal to a theory of justice (justice<sub>2</sub>) different from the theory called into question (justice<sub>1</sub>)? In other words, given two different theories of justice, is it possible to make a comparison between these theories to select the best theory?

- (1) If it is not permissible, then the two theories are incomparable;
- (2) If it is permissible, then it is always possible to formulate a new theory of justice (justice<sub>3</sub>) and to question 'is right<sub>3</sub> just<sub>1</sub>?' or 'is right<sub>3</sub> just<sub>2</sub>?' and so on, with any kind of theory of justice in an infinite multiplication of possible comparisons.

In both cases we cannot identify a privileged theory of justice, nor can we identify criterions through which we can choose between different theories of justice. Indeed, it is always possible to pose the question 'is right<sub>x</sub> criterion<sub>x</sub>?' to any kind of criterion, and the permissible or impermissible answer is ascribable to cases (1) or (2).

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